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Abstract: 
The article argues that “international expertise” is not just a mere continuation of national forms of 
expertise “at the international level”, but has a distinct social and professional pattern (defined as 
constitutive of a ‘weak expert fields’), one that needs to be considered in order to account for the 
definitional power of experts in global governance. The paper tracks the genesis of this specificity in 
the case of international legal expertise, arguably the template against which other forms of expertise 
have historically built their own professional projects. Getting back to the immediate post-WWI period 
and the League of Nations as the inaugural scene for the power-knowledge nexus at the international 
level, the paper analyses the drafting of the first World Court in 1920 as a critical formative moment 
for the definition of the “international expert”. While drafters agreed on the creation of the first 
permanent and professional court, they simultaneously renounced to define who the permanent 
professionals of that court would have to be, therefore depriving international law of any strong 
supranational governance unit. The paper argues that this initial uncoupling between the autonomy (of 
the court) and the heteronomy (of the international lawyer) has shaped the enduring “weak” structure 
of transnational expert fields. 
Keywords: 
International courts; lawyers; expertise; transnational fields  
 
 1 
By many standards, transnational expert fields look like their national counterpart. Functionally 
speaking, one will find « congresses », « learned societies », « scholarly journals » producing 
disciplinary rationalizations and theories on the state of international affairs, just like they would exist 
nationally. Regardless of the disciplinary domain or the policy area, a vast array of international 
research institutes, expert committees and think tanks converge around the “coral reefs” of 
international organizations
1
 such as the United Nations’ agencies or the European Commission, 
providing consultancies and expertise in pretty much the same way one would find in national settings 
vis-à-vis State departments and ministries. This ‘air de famille’ extends to the rhetoric of expertise 
mobilized in these settings. As a number of sociologists
2
, political scientists
3
, transnational historians
4
 
and critical legal scholars
5
 have pointed out, the vernacular of global governance’s experts provides 
diagnoses, narratives (of “progress” and of “intervention”), argumentative strategies (of depoliticizing) 
and repertoires of justification that have developed along the model of national expertise.  
As a result, international expertise has often been thought of as a mere continuation of national 
expertise under other forms, just another domain of intervention for experts. The tradition of 
‘epistemic communities’ studies6, arguably the most successful conceptual apparatus when it comes to 
studying knowledge-based networks, does not help in this regard, as it does not differentiate between 
national and international forms of expertise, taking the notion of “expertise” as a sort of black-box 
that travels unchanged from context to context and from level to level. While international expertise 
has indeed been built along the lines of its national counterpart, it would be seriously misleading to 
take them as interchangeable. It would lead to overlook the fact that what is performed, exchanged and 
produced under the aegis of producing “international expertise” is by many standards very different 
from what occurs in national settings.  
Most recently, a new stream of scholarship on international forms of expertise has actually 
provided a more complex picture of international experts
7… Grounded on Pierre Bourdieu’s field-
theory, but adapting the toolbox to the study of international settings, they have pointed at the 
particular structure of "transnational" fields in domains as different as international terrorism, 
European law, monetary policies, international political economy. While these transnational fields are 
                                                     
1
 Sidney Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
2
 Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth, « Hegemonic Battles, Professional Rivalries, and the International Division of labor in 
the market for the import and export of State governing expertise », International Political Sociology, 5 (3), 2011, p. 276-
293. 
3
 Stephanie Mudge and Antoine Vauchez, “Building Europe on a Weak Field. Law, Economics and Scholarly Avatars in 
Transnational Politics”, American Journal of Sociology, 118(2), 2012, pp. 449-492; Nicolas Guilhot, The Democracy 
Makers: Human Rights and the Politics of Global Order, New York, Columbia University Press, 2005. 
4
 See Pierre-Yves Saunier, « La secrétaire générale, l’ambassadeur et le docteur. Un conte en trois épisodes pour les 
historiens du ‘monde des causes’ à l’époque contemporaine, 1800-2000 », Monde(s). Histoire, Espaces, Relations, 1(1), 
2012, pp. 29-47. 
5
 David Kennedy, « The Politics of the Invisible College. International Governance and the Politics of Expertise », 
European Human Rights Law Review, 5, 2001, p. 463-497; Martii Koskeniemmi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations. The 
Rise and Fall of International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
6
 Emmanuel Adler, Peter Haas, “Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective 
Research Program”, International Organization, 46(1), 1992, p. 367-390. 
7
 Along these lines, see in particular : Antonin Cohen, « ‘Ten Majestic Figures in Long Amaranth Robes’: The Formation 
of the Court of Justice of the European Communities » in Bruno de Witte and Antoine Vauchez (eds.), Lawyering 
Europe. European Law as a Transnational Social Field, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013 ; Mikael Madsen, « Human 
Rights and the Hegemony of Ideology: European Lawyers and the Cold War Battle over International Human Rights », in 
Y Dezalay & B Garth (eds), Lawyers and the Construction of Transnational Justice. Routledge, Abingdon, 2012, pp. 
258-276 ; Lisa Stampnitzky, « Disciplining an Unruly Field: Terrorism Experts and Theories of Scientific Production », 
Qualitative Sociology, vol. 34 (1), 2011, p. 1-19; Frédéric Lebaron « Central bankers in the contemporary global field of 
power », The Sociological Review, 56 (1), 2000, 121-144; Antoine Vauchez, « The Force of a Weak Field », 
International Political Sociology, 2008, p. 120-144. 
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featured by a general agreement on the relevant issues at stake and the legitimate techniques and 
vocabularies at play, they all remain under-regulated fields featured by weak units of internal 
governance. On issues usually considered as key to the development of professional expertise
8
, such as 
peer control over recruitment, rights to practice, licensing processes, there is no such thing as an 
international equivalent to the strong professional and disciplinary settlement of national experts. 
Deprived of state-sanctioned monopolies and of strong regulatory bodies supervising professional 
practices, transnational expert fields are marked by structurally weak internal differentiation and 
porous boundaries with the neighboring fields (politics, bureaucracy, NGOs, academia, economics). In 
the absence of supranational governance units able to control and certify what it takes to be or to 
become an “international expert”, these fields accommodate a great variety of professional profiles, 
thereby turning these spaces into crossroads where otherwise distant, if not antagonist, types of actors 
and legitimacies converge and blend. This can be easily assessed by looking at the great variety of 
social and professional profiles that one will find under the cap of the “international experts”, in the 
corridors of the conferences, among the members of expert committees called upon by international 
organizations, in the academic journals on international affairs: former ministers, supreme court 
judges, high level diplomats, IO’s high civil servants, human rights’ activists, business lawyers, 
academics, public affairs’ consultants,  
Most often than not, the “weak” social and professional structure of transnational expert fields is 
analyzed as a mere sign of incompletion and as a transitory feature in an overall process of 
‘internationalization’ that will progressively get closer to “normal” forms of expertise as embodied by 
national standards
9
. Yet, various studies actually show the contrary as ‘weakness’ is actually an 
enduring feature of “transnational expert fields”10. While there is a growing ‘occupational’ market for 
experts at the international level, the professional organization of expertise has remained strikingly 
weak at the international level. The densification of transnational experts’ networks has not come 
along with equally strong international ‘professional projects’ building the same credentialistic and 
legalistic roots that exist for national experts in domains such as law, economics or political science. 
Rather than following this evolutionary perspective, I argue that this “weak” professional settlement of 
international expertise is not just a transitory phase but constitutes the distinct and historically-
grounded pattern of “transnational expert fields”. I suggest that by taking this perennially weak 
(internal and external) structure of transnational expert fields seriously, one can gain a better 
understanding of what is “international expertise” and how it connects with policies- and polity-
building at the international level
11
.  
This weakness of transnational expert fields suggests two central hypotheses : first, as they are 
crossroads for a variety of (bureaucratic, political, legal, academic, etc.) actors who converge under 
the aegis of building an international expertise, these weak expert fields are not external to the politics 
and policies that claim to decipher; they actually form the very terrain on which overarching cognitive 
frames are debated
12
 ; second, as they are sites where a variety of (bureaucratic, political legal, 
academic, etc.) capitals converge, they are featured by specific pattern of capitalization of expert 
authority (“notables”), based on the accumulation of capital across a variety adjacent fields 
(bureaucratic, political, legal, academic, etc.). Of course, one should certainly not overemphasize, let 
                                                     
8
 Magali Sarfati Larson, The Rise of Professionalism. A Sociological Analysis, Berkeley, University of California Press, 
1979; and Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions, op. cit. 
9
 This argument is developed in greater details in Antoine Vauchez, “Introducing a Weak Field Approach to the Study of 
Transnational Settings” International Political Sociology 5(3), 2008, p. 340–45. 
10
 Lisa Stampnitsky, « Experts, State and field-theory. Learning from the case of terrorism », Critique internationale, vol. 
59, 2013, p. 89-104. 
11
 On the notion of ‘weak fields’, see Antoine Vauchez, “The Force of a Weak Field. Law, Lawyers and the Government of 
Europe. Elements for a Renewed Research Agenda”, International Political Sociology, vol. 2, 2008, pp. 128-144;  
12
 Stephanie Mudge and Antoine Vauchez, “Building Europe on a Weak Field. Law, Economics and Scholarly Avatars in 
Transnational Politics”, art. cit. 
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alone naturalize, the difference between “national” and “transnational” expert fields13. However, while 
there are some national fields of expertise that may have an equally weak social structure lacking 
state-sanctioned monopolies and strong professional governance
14
, I argue in this paper that the 
weakness is actually a defining and enduring feature of transnational expert fields.  
To support this claim, I suggest to trace back how transnational expert fields initially formed and 
consolidated. In line with Max Weber’s reading of fields (or ‘spheres of values’) as the product of 
specific historical processes, and with Pierre Bourdieu’s understanding of fields’ differentiation as 
part of a long-term narrative of State-formation
15, I argue that “fields” are not universal and trans-
historical social units but context-specific and historically-grounded
16
. In a context where the notion of 
“field” has increasingly been used in a de-historicized and abstract manner (“one size fits all”)17, I 
suggest that it would be beneficial to bring history back in and pay attention to the historical 
trajectories of different types of fields. Just like « national expert fields » have historically emerged in 
deep entanglement with State-building processes
18, I contend hereafter that “transnational expert 
fields”19 have a particular social and professional pattern (hereafter defined as « weak » in comparison 
to their national counterpart), whose formation and trajectory can be traced back from the first part of 
the XXth century. If « transnational expert fields » have a pattern of their own, then it is the task of the 
sociologist to trace back their historical trajectory. By doing this, I do not mean to engage in historical 
investigation like an historian would do, neither do I try to write a full history of international 
expertise; rather, I wish to explore formative moments, small sequences of time where a particular 
social and professional constellation coalesces and consolidates, thereby progressively marginalizing 
other possible futures for international expert fields. In line with historical institutionalism
20
, but 
following more broadly the tradition of historical sociology, I use history here as a method, singling 
out « historical sequences in which contingent events set into motion institutional patterns or event 
chains that have deterministic properties »
21
. In this context, the institutional genesis of the first World 
Court in the immediate post-WWI period and the formation of the first permanent and professional 
international judiciary stand out as one essential critical juncture for the invention of international 
forms of expertise. Drawing from previous research conducted some years ago with Guillaume 
Sacriste on the authority of international lawyers in the 1920s (2007)
22
, but expanding it to a whole 
new empirical material, I have followed extensively the public debates over the creation of a World 
Court in the immediate post-WWI period: this includes essentially journals, mémoires, proceedings of 
                                                     
13
 On this, see recently, Gisèle Sapiro, « Le champ est-il national ? La théorie de la différenciation sociale au prisme de 
l’histoire globale », Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, n°200, déc. 2013, pp. 70-86. 
14
 Seethe field of American think tanks as analyzed by Tom Medvetz, Think tanks in America, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 2012. 
15 In particular : Pierre Bourdieu, Sur l’Etat. Cours au Collège de France, Paris, Seuil, 2012. 
16
 Cf. Lisa Stampnitsky, « Experts, State and field-theory. Learning from the case of terrorism », Critique internationale, 
vol. 59, 2013, p. 89-104. 
17
 The most important and wide-ranging theoretical construction in that direction is that of Neil Fligstein and Doug 
McAdam, « Toward a General Theory of Strategic Action Fields », Sociological Theory, 2011, vol. 29, p. 1-26. 
18
 Pierre Bourdieu, Sur l’Etat, op. cit. 
19
 See also Madsen Mikael, “Transnational Fields: Elements of a Reflexive Sociology of the Internationalisation of Law”, 
Retfaerd. Nordisk Juridisk Tidsskrift, 29 (3), 2005, pp. 34-41 
20
 In a large literature, see Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, "Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science," 
in Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner (eds.), Political Science: The State of the Discipline, New York, Norton, 2002, p. 
693-721. 
21
 James Mahoney, « Path dependence in historical sociology », Theory and society, 29, 2000, pp 507-548; for an overview 
of this approach, see Pierson Paul, Theda Skocpol, "Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science," in Ira 
Katznelson and Helen Milner (eds.), Political Science: The State of the Discipline, New York, Norton, 2002, p. 693-721. 
22
 See in particular, Guillame Sacriste and Antoine Vauchez, « The Force of International Law: Lawyers’ Diplomacy on the 
International Scene in the 1920s. », Law and Social Inquiry, vol. 32, 2007, p. 83-107. 
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learned societies, major newspapers and the minutes of the 35 meetings of the Advisory committee of 
jurists (hereafter the “ACJ”) that was constituted by the Council of the League of Nation in order to 
draft the court’s Statute (16th June 1920-12th July 1920). I have also considered the broader historical 
phase that runs from the entry into effect of the Covenant of the League of Nations on the 10
th
 January 
1920 to the first year of functioning of the Permanent court of international justice (hereafter, the 
« World Court ») when the Statute entered into force (from the 15
th
 February 1922 onwards)
23
. While 
there are some in-depth studies of this historical episode
24
, my purpose here is to study it with the 
lenses of a historical sociology of experts and expertise. In line with the ‘instrumental’ conception of 
historical research as a tool for a sociological inquiry delineated above, I have focused essentially on 
the debates and controversies over the definition of the international judicial office, with a particular 
interest on how social and professional requirements and incompatibilities had been set. 
The general claim of this paper is that this post-WWI episode is not just illustrative of transnational 
expert fields, but is actually constitutive of their particular social and professional structure as “weak 
fields”. While the drafters of the World Court Statute agreed on the creation of a permanent judicial 
institution, they simultaneously gave up on defining who the permanent professionals of that 
permanent institution would be, thereby accepting_that there would be no corresponding supranational 
profession for that new international organization. The under-regulated and porous field of 
international law that coalesced on that particular occasion forms a new type of social and professional 
arrangement constitutive of transnational expert fields
25
. In a preliminary section, I explain why the 
post-WWI drafting of the World Court can be taken as an authentic turning point in the historical 
trajectory of transnational expert fields. In the second section, I trace back the formation of a 
‘tribunalist paradigm’26 within the committee, that recognizes the necessity of a permanent and 
professionalized court at the international level. Such unlikely advancement–I argue in a third section- 
is in part made possible by the failure to design a supranational judicature for the new court, thereby 
authorizing a large variety of diplomats, politicians and civil servants to access judicial office at 
international level. In the concluding section, I analyze how this historical detour can shed a new light 
on transnational expert fields. 
                                                     
23
 The proceedings of the ACJ is however the very core of the empirical material considered for this paper as it is the arena 
where the vast majority of the deals on the Statute originated: Permanent Court of International Justice, Advisory 
committee of jurists, Procès-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the Committee, June 16th-July 24th, with Annexes, The Hague, 
Van Langenhuysen Bros., 1920 (hereafter Proceedings). The fact that many of its members would then later become also 
representatives of their own country in the meetings of the November-December 1920 General Assembly discussing the 
final draft of the Statute was certainly critical in maintaining the initial outcome almost unchanged. The subcommittee of 
the General Assembly drafting the Statute of the Permanent court was chaired by Léon Bourgeois and 5 of its 11 
members had taken part to the ACJ committee: League of Nations, Records of the First Assembly. Plenary Meetings, 
Geneva, 1920. I also follow the drafting of the Court’s Règlement intérieur in its first year of functioning: Cour 
permanente de justice internationale, Actes et documents relatifs à l’organisation de la Cour. Préparation du Règlement 
de la Cour. Procès verbaux des séances de la session préliminaire de la Cour (30 janvier-24 mars 1922), Publications de 
la CPIJ, Série D, Leyden, Sijthoff, 1922. 
24
 To this day, the most complete account is by Ole Spiermann, “Who Attempts Too Much Does Nothing Well: The 1920 
Advisory Committee of Jurists and the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice”, 73, British Yearbook of 
International Law, 187, 2002, and his book International Legal Argument in the Permanent Court of International 
Justice. The Rise of the International Judiciary, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. Other studies include: 
Lloyd Lorna, « ’A springboard for the future’. A historical examination of Britain’s role in shaping the optional clause of 
the PCIJ », American Journal of International Law, 1985, pp. 28-52; and Dune Michael, The United States and the World 
Court (1920-1935), Pinter Publishers, Londres, 1988. 
25
 This ‘weakness’ is quite remarkable when one compares this structure with national legal fields historically anchored in 
solid professional settlements : cf. Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions. An Essay of the Division of Expert Labor, 
Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1988; Richard Abel and Philip Lewis (eds), Lawyers in Society. An Overview, 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1995, 3 vol. 
26
 On the notion of tribunalism, see Thomas Skouteris, The Notion of Progress in International Law Discourse, The Hague, 
T M C Asser Press, 2010. 
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I. The Constitutive Potential of Post-WWI Critical Juncture 
Very few documents have actually channeled and delimited in such a lasting manner all subsequent 
undertakings in the domain of international affairs as the World Court Statute. Whereas most League 
of Nations’ institutions were profoundly reframed in post-WWII period in the light of what was 
viewed as their overall ‘failure’ in the 1930s, the Permanent Court of International Justice was among 
the very few to be almost entirely saved in the 1945 Charter of the United Nations
27
. Overall, the 
Statute is a striking case of institutional isormorphism and path-dependency: while international and 
regional courts have proliferated ever since WWII
28
, the Statute has remained the essential backdrop 
and template against which ‘true (international) courtness’ has been assessed29. This first section 
analyzes reasons for which the drafting of the first World Court is a turning point in the historical 
trajectory of transnational expert fields in general. 
i) An Inaugural Scene for the Power-Knowledge Nexus at the International Level 
By many standards, post-WWI period forms the act of birth of the power-knowledge nexus at the 
international level. While traditional historiography on the inter-war period has long been essentially 
« rise and fall narratives »
30, with international relations’ scholars pointing at the many « illusions » 
and « failures » of League of Nations, recent streams of scholarship in global and transnational history 
have provided a more complex account, underscoring the critical role of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) and the League of Nations (LoN) in setting the stage for a whole range of 
international policies (from human rights to drug control, public health or cultural exchange)
31
. As 
these authors have convincingly argued, Geneva constituted an authentic laboratory where 
international forms of expertise, knowledge-based networks, and repertoires of solutions for 
international government were first defined. No one would deny that early forms of international 
scientific socialization (congresses, learned societies, had emerged before WWI, providing a first 
transnational umbrella for academic mobilization
32
. However, these first experts’ arenas had no 
international political outlet as the international organizations that existed at the time –most of them 
actually founded after 1870- were essentially technical organizations with limited competences in 
domains such as navigations, communications, commerce, etc
33… The multilateral institutional setting 
that emerged in Geneva from 1919 onwards, and its unforeseen expansion in a variety of policy 
                                                     
27
 Manley Hudson, “The Succession of the International Court of Justice to the Permanent Court of International Justice”, 
American Journal of International Law, 51 (3), p. 569-573, 1957, p. 570. 
28
 See Karen Alter, “The Evolving International Judiciary”, Annual Review of Law and Social Sciences, 2011, p. 387-415, 
and Romano Cesare, Daniel Terris, Stephen Schwebel, Joanne Myers, The International Judge: An Introduction to the 
Men and Women Who Decide the World's Cases, Brandeis, 2007. 
29
 From European courts to more recent international courts such as the International Criminal Court, all statutes have 
drawn extensively from that of 1922, often copy-pasting some entire sections of it. As Jir Malenowski indicates : « the 
European Court of Justice, the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, or the international 
tribunal for the law of the sea are in large part modeled on the Statute of the Permanent court of international justice, in 
particular for what regards the statute of judges » : Jiri Malenovski, « L’indépendance des juges internationaux », Recueil 
des cours de La Haye, vol. 349, 2010, pp. 9-276, p. 36 (my translation).  
30
 Susan Pedersen, “Review Essay. Back to the League of Nations”, The Am. Historical Review, 112(4), 2007. 
31
 Akira Iryie, Global Community. The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World, 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 2002 ; Mark Mazower, Governing the World. The Rise and Fall of an Idea, 
London, Allen Lane, 2012; Sandrine Kott and Joëlle Droux, Globalizing Social Rights. The International Labor 
Organization and Beyond, Palgrave McMillan, 2013. 
32
 Anne Rasmussen, L’Internationale scientifique 1890-1914, Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, Ecole des Hautes 
Etudes en Sciences Sociales de Paris, 1995; Johan Heilbron, Nicolas Guilhot, and Laurent Jeanpierre, “Towards a 
Transnational History of the Social Sciences”, Journal of the History of Behavioral Sciences, 44 (2), 2008, p. 146-160. 
33
 Michael Wallace and David Singer, “Intergovernmental Organization in the Global System (1815-1914). A Quantitative 
Description”, International Organization, 2(24), 1970, p. 239-267. 
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domains dramatically changed the international state of affairs. With the creation of the League of 
Nations (hereafter « LofN ») and the International Labor Organization (hereafter « ILO »), 
international organizations moved from ad hoc technical institutions populated by professionals most 
often recruited locally, to a set of generalist institutions with far-reaching competences and a 
permanent body of several thousand international civil servants
34
.  
In their search for an autonomous source of legitimacy that would grant them some autonomy vis-
à-vis the “great powers,” the Permanent secretariat as well as the new web of bureaux, working 
sections and permanent subcommittees of the LoN and of the ILO immediately generated a wide 
variety of international expert groups, bringing to Geneva hundreds of experts
35
 on matters as different 
as air navigation, hydrographic issues, contagious diseases of animals, opium traffic, protection of 
children, refugees, health-related issues, etc. Thereby, a nascent field of international expertise 
emerged out of the competition between various disciplinary and national traditions, particularly when 
it came to providing consultancy in matters of general politics. In a post-war context, characterized by 
the collapse of the preexisting frameworks of understanding of international relations (cf. the 
diplomatic handling of the « Concert of Europe »), a new setting was therefore been inaugurated 
where academic disciplines —the history of diplomatic relations, international political economy, 
international law, competed over the production of the international expertise most relevant and 
legitimate for the leaders of this new multilateral framework. 
ii) Law as the Template for Expert Fields 
Yet, on that battleground, international law benefited from a sort of “natural” precedence over its 
competitors. Proof to that is the fact that the creation of the Advisory committee of jurists (« ACJ »)- 
tasked with the drafting of the “permanent court” that the Covenant referred to in its article XIV was 
one of the very first decisions taken for the Council of the League of Nations as early as February 
1920, that is less than a month after the entry into force of the treaty of Versailles and the Covenant. 
Given the central role of law schools in the training and socialization of political and bureaucratic 
elites in the first part of the XXth century
36
, legal expertise was undoubtedly the most natural device 
when it came to erect the newly-established international organizations on firm grounds
37
. Ever since 
the turn of the XXth century, a ‘tribunalist’ movement had actually emerged which viewed 
international adjudication as the most rational and efficient technique for establishing a lasting peace. 
The coalition, very diverse, was composed of philanthropists, social activists, and was famously 
heralded by liberal statesmen such as Elihu Root or Léon Bourgeois, both of them Peace Noble Prize 
(1912 and 1919) and ‘gentlemen politicians of the law’38. In the decade preceding the opening of the 
ACJ, countless World Court projects had actually been put forward by philanthropic organizations 
(Carnegie endowment for international peace), political movements (the Fabian society in 1916), 
associations (the Netherlands’ branch of the Organisation centrale pour une paix durable in 1917, the 
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 On this, see Frédéric Megret, “The Rise and Fall of the International Man”, Oxford University Press, to be published. 
35
 Sacriste Guillaume, Antoine Vauchez, “The Force of International Law”, art. cit.; Neil de Marchi, “League of Nations’ 
Economists and the Ideal of Peaceful Change in the Decade of the Thirties”; in Craufurd Goodwin (eds.), Economics and 
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Conference of the League of Nations associations in 1919)
39
, learned societies (Union juridique 
internationale in 1920), or even countries (the joint expert committee nominated by the governments 
of Danemark, Norway and Sweden in 1919), etc
40… The political atmosphere of the post-WWI 
period, in particular the general agreement among diplomats and statesmen that the event of the war 
imposed radically new solutions (different from the power balance of the « Concert of Europe »), 
opened an unprecedented window of opportunity: suddenly, what once seemed an utopian project 
became a sound institutional prospect capable of marking the new foundations on which the League of 
Nations and international relations would have to be grounded. 
That this legal project be on the top of the League of Nations’ political agenda is certainly not a 
trivial fact in the history of international expertise. As historians and sociologists of professions have 
shown, legal expertise has historically been the laboratory where modern and professionalized forms 
of expertise emerged. In her comparative historical sociology of professions in Europe, Maria 
Malatesta exemplifies that fields of expertise as we know them nationally have been profoundly 
shaped by professional models initiated in the legal profession in the second half of the XXth 
century
41
. The first bills concerning professional regulation and expertise that were passed in the years 
immediately following the foundation of Wilhelmine Germany, post-Risorgimento Italy, or IIIrd 
Republic France, have indeed all concerned the professional practice of law. In these circumstances, a 
triangular pattern of professional governance emerged that brought together in a stable relationship the 
legal profession, law schools, and the State, linking together the licensing power of the first, the 
credentializing capacities of the second and the nation-wide monopolies granted by the third
42
. This 
triadic structure of national legal field would soon become the template and the ideal-type against 
which other types of expertise modeled their own « professional project »
43
 as they concentrated on 
acquiring certified forms of knowledge, clear-cut occupational boundaries, professional self-regulation 
and state-sanctioned monopoly
44
.  
iii) Charting the Field of International Law  
Drafting a Court Statute in this critical juncture implied much more than just writing down rules of 
procedure. It meant first of all providing international legal expertise with the critical institutional 
device when it comes to assure its social robustness. Not only did the creation of a permanent « court » 
would evidence the fact that international law was a body of law “like the others” (that is in part 
autonomous from political logics and justiciable before a court), thereby fortifying its social authority 
in international affairs, but it would also provide international law professionals with an institutional 
platform for their claim for autonomy. With the scientization of legal knowledge in the second half of 
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the XIXth century
45
, and its claim for the autonomy of the law, professionalized and independent 
courts had become the “clé de voute” marking the existence of an ‘authentic’ legal field.  
Moreover, as they were giving birth to the first World Court, the ten legal experts brought together 
in the ACJ were designing much more than just an organization. As they would discuss modes of 
recruitment for international judges, parties allowed in the courtroom, judges’ interlocutors (lawyers, 
diplomats), official sources of the law (treaties, scholarship, etc…), or future projects (« a conference 
of the nations » for codification, the creation of a criminal court, etc…), the drafters were assessing the 
relative legitimacy of the various institutions (States, Council of the League of Nations, General 
Assembly, etc…), professional groups (law professors, State agents, diplomats, judges, etc…), and 
resources (political, economic, legal, bureaucratic) in the production of international law. As the 
Statute’s task was precisely to locate the ability and responsibility for the proper functioning of the 
World Court, it required to establish boundaries, roles and hierarchies that ultimately resulted in 
delineating a miniaturized representation of what the future field of international law would (and 
should) look like. As a result, the many definitional battles that emerged among the 10 legal experts 
were not just abstract controversies. The particular legal of political legitimacy of the Statute which 
originated its initial source (the Covenant of League of Nations) and its adoption by the General 
Assembly of the League of Nations, turned its drafting into an overall contest over the architecture of 
the field of international law and the relative weight of national models of law, institutions and 
professional groups. 
iv) A Symbolic Coup 
What ultimately constitutes the drafting of the World Court as a defining moment lies the fact that 
something new crystallized in the drafting process that had not emerged up to that moment. One 
should recall that the swift creation of the World Court, less than three years after the drafting 
committee had been nominated, marked a rather unexpected conclusion if one considers the many 
deadlocks that had previously hindered the emergence of international forms of adjudication. This is 
all the truer that, apart from giving a name to the new institution (a “permanent court of international 
justice”), the Covenant had provided very few indications as to what the “fourth principal organ” of 
the League of Nations (after the Secretariat, the Council and the General Assembly) ought to look like. 
Given such vagueness, many different outcomes were still possible and it seemed likely that the 
workings of the ACJ would result in the creation of just another arbitration court. Previous experiences 
in international courts and tribunals had actually not been very fortunate : in 1907, a Central American 
Court of Justice had been settled in Cartago (Costa Rica) but the experience was short-lived and did 
not survive the dramatic earthquake that destroyed the court’s building in 1910. The precedent of the 
Permanent court of arbitration established in The Hague in 1907 was not much more comforting: 
although it was still operating, most international lawyers considered it as both a ‘fake’ court (judging 
in ‘political equity’ rather than in legal terms) and a ‘failed’ court for it had proved incapable of 
preventing the world conflict. Given such precedents, it comes as no surprise that there be a great 
sense of uncertainty as the ACJ started to meet. Suffice it to look at a mere sample of the list of issues 
that the Legal secretariat of the League of Nations established as the agenda that the ACJ would have 
to tackle :  
“What is the intention of the Covenant of the League of Nations as regards the juridical character 
of this Court. There are several alternatives. The Court may be regarded as a pure Court of Justice, 
or as a Court of Arbitration, or as a combination of the two”. And later : “what features should 
distinguish a permanent court of international justice ? Real permanency: how to define ? Can the 
above features (being a court) be conciliated with arbitral functions? If so shall new Court be, at 
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the same time, Court of Justice and of Arbitration? (…) What qualifications should be fulfilled by 
the members of the Court ? (…) Shall high juridical competency be required from all the members 
of the Court? (…) Where juridical knowledge is required, how shall the existence of such 
knowledge be stated ? (…) Who is finally to decide in doubtful cases whether conditions are 
fulfilled or not?”, etc.
46
  
In this light, the agreement reached by the ACJ on the creation of a permanent, juridical and 
professionalized court can be read an authentic symbolic coup that marked a rupture with the past. The 
New York Times journalist sent to The Hague seemed himself astonished: “compared with other 
conferences of the last two years, the League Court conference can be said to be literally forging 
ahead. In spite of a wide divergence of opinion at yesterday’s session on the question of the laws of 
the court, a tentative agreement was reached this morning on the subject of minor changes (…) There 
is a feeling of great optimism among the jurists, who agree that the creation of a world court will a 
great fact”47. The same could be said about the rather easy and diligent diplomatic process that 
spanned from the presentation of the ACJ Report on the 12
th
 June 1920 to its actual adoption by the 
General Assembly and the Council of League of Nations on 13
th
 December of that same year. Finally 
adopted and endorsed by the most legitimate international arenas and actors of the time, from 
individual States (with the still ambiguous exception of the United States
48
) to the Council and the 
General Assembly, from diplomats to philanthropists or international statesmen, the Statute had 
become the natural common anchor point for the field of international law.  
 
 
Basic Chronology of the World Court’s Genesis 
 
 
10
th
 January 1920: the treaty of Versailles and the Covenant officially come into effect. 
13
th
 February 1920: meeting of the second session of the Council of the LoN in London where the nomination of 
an Advisory committee of jurists tasked with the drafting of the World Court is announced. 
16
th
 June 1920: opening of the Advisory Committee of Jurists’ workings. 
12
th
 July 1920: official presentation of the Draft Statute for the ACJ. 
30
th
 July -5
th
 August 1920: at the eight session of the Council of the LoN held in San Sebastian, the Draft Statute 
is presented. 
23 October 1920: the Council of the LoN meets and revises the Draft Statute, depriving the Court of its 
compulsory jurisdiction. 
17
th
 November-16
th
 December 1920: the Draft Statute is discussed at the third commission of the League of 
Nations’ General Assembly and, later, in the plenary session. 
13
th
 -14
th
 September 1921: Election of the 15 judges of the court. 
15
th
 February 1922: Inauguration of the World Court in The Hague. 
 
For all these reasons, the particular social and professional arrangement that came out of the workings 
of the Advisory committee of jurists had from its very beginning a strong constitutive potential not 
only for international law expertise itself but for transnational expert fields in general. 
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II. Autonomizing the Law. The Genesis of the Tribunalist Paradigm 
When Léon Bourgeois, French foreign affairs minister and well-known promoter of international 
adjudication, took the floor at the eighth session of the Council of the League of Nations in San 
Sebastian early August 1920, to present the World Court Statute that the Advisory committee of jurists 
had just drafted, he emphatically insisted on one essential novelty : the new court –he said- will be “a 
‘truly’ Permanent Court, in which a regular jurisprudence can develop, a Court strictly juridical and 
rigorously judicial, free from all pre-occupations and all influence of a political nature”49. While this is 
certainly a rather optimistic view of what the court actually was and would become, it is revealing of 
the fact that this organization would have to be assessed on new grounds: not anymore as a diplomatic 
tool aimed at securing « collective security » but as a judicial institution pursuing « justice ». 
Underneath this shift to a “tribunalist” paradigm lied the scientist belief –strong among the promoters 
of the World Court- that the judicial way of settling international disputes was politically and morally 
superior to any other forms of dispute resolution from political negotiation to good offices, from 
diplomatic conferences to mediation, etc… Hereafter, I argue that this initial agreement on the general 
principles underpinning the World Court was not trivial, nor inconsequential but actually instrumental 
to the formation of a field of international law hereafter defined as a set of specialized and 
interdependent actors and positions brought and bound together by a competition over the 
authoritative handling of international law expertise. 
i) Ius Proprium 
Interestingly, one of the very first questions that came to the ground in the ACJ was the apparently 
purely speculative issue of recognizing (or not) the existence of a specific province for international 
law, one distinct from that of politics. There were actually good reasons to believe that the ten 
wisemen would actually reject the idea that there be something like purely legal issues. In its 
Memorandum introducing the debates, the secretariate of the ACJ recalled that previous committees 
and congresses had acknowledged “the impossibility of drawing a precise line of demarcation between 
legal disputes of a legal nature and those general described as political”50. When he opened the 
inaugural session, ACJ president the Belgium Descamps recalled that among the « difficulties 
submitted to the Jurists’ Committee (…) is the difficulty of finding a clear line of demarcation 
between those two classes (‘legal’ and ‘political’ issues), (given) the mixed character of certain 
differences which are considered as proceeding at the same time from law and from politics »
51
. There 
was in fact another reason to be sceptical about the possibility to draw a dividing line
52
. While they all 
had a law degree, “politics” was all over the place, the ten wisemen being themselves deeply 
embedded in national political and diplomatic networks. A majority of them were actually directly 
connected to their government, as former or current jurisconsultes (Ricci Buzzati), ambassadors 
(Adatci, Raul Fernandes, Lord Phillimore) or ministries (Gram, Hagerup, Root, Descamps). There 
were some full-time law professors (Geouffre de Lapradelle, Altamira) and judges (Loder), but even 
them owed their nomination to the committee to the fact that they had been advising and representing 
their national government in a variety of international conferences and treaty negotiations.  
Strikingly however, they all recognized the extreme importance of proclaiming the existence of a 
dividing line between “law” and “politics”. All along the 35 meetings of the ACJ, recurring efforts 
would be made to keep the ‘political’ outside of the debates. Probably because these jurists remained 
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so closely connected to the defense/representation of their national governments, their exchanges 
rested on the gentlemen’s agreements that each one of them would avoid bringing to the forefront 
what was so deeply divisive (ie national and diplomatic interests). This required self-discipline and a 
form of collective surveillance to any possible breach: when the British member, Lord Phillimore, 
indicated that the World Court would need to have an English judge in its ranks, the French member, 
Geouffre de La Pradelle disqualified the intervention as « a political argument » that was out of place. 
Even the most seasoned and prominent politician of the committee, Elihu Root, former US State 
secretary and republican leader, would however continuously « deprecate anyone’s attributing a 
‘political aspect’ to his presence (in the committee), adding that the work of the committee was 
« entirely technical »
53
. Securing a purely legal discussion was not just a matter of keeping a 
dispassionate exchange, it was also a test of lawyers’ capacity to provide a credible and rational 
methodology to tackle international political issues
54
. It is not surprising therefore that when it came to 
recognize the summa divisio “between the political and the juridical point of view”55, a clear majority 
emerged in favor of asserting the existence of an autonomous realm of (international) law. When the 
Italian jurist expressed a dissenting voice regarding the possibility of drawing a line between « politics 
and law, equity and justice » and of « founding the new Court on distinctions of this character »
56
, 
« his views –a commentator reports- which were listened to with respect, did not have influence »57…  
ii) A Juridicized Court  
The recognition of the law’s proprium in international affairs was far from trivial : it implied that, just 
like in national legal systems, juridical issues could not be handled by a ad hoc and parties-based 
institution (such as arbitration tribunals), but exclusively through a permanent and specialized 
institution able to unveil, through its continuous case-law, the fundamental legal principles of the 
‘international community’. Yet again, drawing that dividing line between arbitration and adjudication 
was far from obvious as there had always been an overall confusion between the two at the 
international level. It was actually still relatively unclear whether the « permanent court » mentioned 
in the Covenant would be a ‘political council’, a ‘juridical court’ or an ‘international academy’ of 
wisemen: in the context of US political field for example, there was a sharp contrast between Elihu 
Root’s enthusiastic support of judicial settlements’ techniques and Woodrow Wilson’s opposition to 
any legalistic understanding of dispute resolution
58
. Even some of the strongest advocates of the 
project of an international court, like Brazilian prominent politician and law professor, Rui Barbosa, 
were actually highly critical about the idea of taking national courts as a model: « if the judicial system 
is preferable in the matter of relations between individuals, the arbitral system is the only one that is 
applicable between nations, who only submit to such authorities as they wish to accept », adding that 
the creation of a Court would be « rather a dangerous innovation, reactionary in its tendencies and in 
its probable results » (1907). The many names that had been suggested over the previous decade for 
the World Court actually all mixed judicial and arbitral terminologies : « permanent tribunal of 
arbitration », « court of arbitrators », « court of permanent arbitration »... Even the project heralded by 
Elihu Root and the American delegation at 1907 The Hague conference, arguably the project that was 
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pushing the most in the direction of « judicializing » international arbitration, was entitled a project for 
« a court of arbitral justice »… 
In this context, the explicit preference of members of the ACJ for a permanent and judicialized 
court is far from trivial. Instead of defining the new institution as a continuation of diplomacy by other 
means, as had been done at the 1899 and 1907 The Hague Conference, the ACJ members claimed that 
the continuity would now have to be found with national models of justice. While admitting some of 
the specificities of international courts, the president of the Advisory Committee insisted on the need 
to “model the organism of international jurisdiction upon the prototype of national jurisdiction”59: only 
a court –that is a specialized and permanent institution- would be able to provide the lasting (legal) 
principles for peace. All along the proceedings, ACJ members repeatedly insisted on the fact that they 
were building an ‘authentic court’, ‘a true court of justice’60, ‘a court of justice in the true sense of the 
word’61, a ‘genuine court of justice’62, etc... This doesn’t mean that the Statute actually satisfied all 
expected features of ‘authentic’ courts, but rather that international courts would, from now on, be 
judged and assessed against standards of ‘true courtness’ as embodied by national models of judiciary. 
iii) Professional Jurist vs. Diplomat 
Last but not least, the recognition of a permanent court opened the floor for a debate over the 
composition of the bench itself. Here again, the idea of an international court exclusively composed of 
professional jurists made little sense in the pre-WWI period: it was considered obvious that, just as 
there was no separation between law and diplomacy, experienced ambassadors and diplomats would 
be the best possible candidate to hold the international judicial office. For instance, a reknown pacifist 
organization, the Institut international de la paix, had put forth a draft which proposed a permanent 
court of justice consisting of sovereigns and of ambassadors accredited to The Hague (plus the Dutch 
minister of foreign affairs who would be an ex ufficio member). And most of the other World Court 
projects only referred to ‘the highest moral reputation’ as a requisit for nomination. The exclusion of 
those who were then the very actors of the international politics, that is diplomats, was therefore far 
from obvious. Yet again, arbitrators quickly became the counter-example against which the new bench 
would have to be built. French law professor Geouffre de Lapradelle critically referred to the 
Permanent court of arbitration as a « college of mediators, diplomats, conciliators », « only half (of 
them) jurisconsults, the other half are politicians »
63
. Creating an « authentic » court capable of dealing 
with specifically « legal matters » required the establishment of a « truly permanent and professional 
judicature such as we know to be assured in national jurisdiction » which implied to rule out 
politicians and diplomats from international judicial office.  
On the whole then, the members of the committee, regardless of their oft antagonist national and 
political affiliations, agreed to recognize that international law as defined in the Statute was indeed a 
specific site of contention in international affairs. As they agreed on the relevant vocabulary 
(scientific) and rhetorical strategies (universalistic), as they shared the same belief in the value of the 
game and in the centrality of the Court therein, the members of the ACJ laid the basis for a 
transnational field of international law.  
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III. ‘Heteronomizing’ the Field: Manufacturing Weakness 
This autonomization of specifically legal vocabularies and issues should not however hide the fact the 
field of international law that was emerging from the workings of the ACJ was organized on a 
profoundly heteronomous social and professional structure. In the following section, I show that the 
unanimity reached in the expert committee on the World Court Statute has only been made possible by 
the fact that all legal experts simultaneously agreed not to create a supranational governance unit for 
the field, thereby depriving that new Court from the capacity to weigh upon, let alone monopolize, the 
definition of the dominant forms of capital and of authority in the field. This renouncement to 
establish a supranational level of professional regulation is integral to the shaping of this emerging 
field of international law as a « weak field ». 
Interestingly, while the tone of the committee’s discussions was generally cordial and 
dispassionate, it would suddenly turn controversial as soon as its members would tackle the issue of 
who the permanent officials of this new permanent institution (judges, litigants, etc…) would have to 
be and what kind of rules and incompatibilities they would have to respect: in other words, when the 
debates dealt with the issue of professional regulation (recruitment procedures, legal credentials, rights 
to practice, regulatory bodies, etc.), the committee would encounter particular difficulties up to a point 
that I was putting in danger the very possibility to reach a deal. As this section shows, this obstacle 
would only be circumvented by avoiding to build any supranational form of professional governance 
in this emerging field of international law. 
It must be said that the most zealous proponents of the World Court had initially hoped for the 
formation of self-ruled supranational bench
64
. In his proposal of statute sent to the ACJ, Clovis 
Bevilacqua, the legal adviser of the Brazilian government, had made such a daring suggestion: judges, 
he suggested, would have to be selected through a supranational recruitment made by the court itself. 
“No other electoral body –he added hopefully- should be more competent, no other could inspire 
greater confidence for this selection of capable men”65. Another option, heralded by the Spanish 
representative, Rafael Altamira, was to ask for national legal authorities of various types -“the 
Supreme court, the Law faculties, and the Official or Royal (if any Academies of Law and moral and 
political science)”- to prepare a list of candidates among which each government would have to 
choose
66
. However, these proposals were immediately dismissed by the representatives of the great 
powers who had no intention to relinquish the possibility to nominate judges. Bevilacqua’s suggestion 
was not even considered and Altamira’s proposal caused the irony of the British judge Lord Phillimore 
who said that he “respected M. Altamira’s view, but he could not forget that Spain was the land of 
Don Quixotte”… sparking a bitter exchange between the two lawyers67! When it became clear that 
there would be no self-governed and no self-recruited bench, the discussion moved on to who the 
international judge would have to be. While the members of the Advisory committee had agreed in 
very general terms that the judge would have to be a « legal professional », it was still not clear what 
this precisely entailed : what sort of professional profile did the candidates need to have ? What sort of 
incompatibilities would the judge have to respect while in office ?  
i) Blurring Professional Settlements 
The first issue that came to the table was that of the professional prerequisits that would be required to 
become an international judge. There was some hope, particularly on the British part, that -as the ACJ 
was moving toward a more ‘authentic’ court- the requirements would include more experience on the 
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bench
68
. Lord Phillimore quite bluntly stated his preferences on the subject-matter : « good judges are 
required –not merely jurisconsults. A good jurisconsult is not necessarily a good judge. A judge must 
possess the qualities of loyalty, high moral character, open-mindedness, courage and patience »
69
. This 
could « only be found among persons trained in law, seasoned by experience at the bar, and, if 
possible, by experience upon the bench in their respective countries »
70
. As the personal legal adviser 
of Elihu Root, James Brown Scott, recalls: « English-speaking members (…) did not look with favor 
upon the appointment of persons versed only in international law », adding that « no question could be 
more important; none was discussed at greater length by the committee » recalls James Brown Scott.
71
. 
Expectedly, this immediately ignited a bitter dispute within the committee that even leaked into the 
press. The New York Times mentioned that « one of the most difficult problems of the world court has 
now been reached. Each member outlined his opinion at length, but no agreement was arrived at 
between the ‘looser methods of continental law’ and the ‘Anglo-american view’ »72. Deeply different 
definitions of the judiciary function were in opposition between the “international magistrate judge” 
drawn from the bar, as defended by the common law countries, and the “international professor judge” 
or the “jurisconsult judge” promoted by civil law countries. It must be said that the stakes were not 
just symbolic. Choosing one professional model for the international judicial office implied to 
privilege one national way of law over the others. This was not a trivial circumstance, considering that 
these models of law corresponded to historically-rooted and highly idiosyncratic national legal fields. 
Unsurprisingly, it became soon clear that none of the parties was ready to give up on an issue that 
involved national and professional interests. As a result, the wisemen renounced defining the 
professional requirements in precise terms. While there would be a World Court, there would be no 
corresponding world-wide profession for that institution and all national species of legal professionals 
would be accepted. It all occurs as if the price to pay for the creation of an World Court was to forego 
a set of unified rules for the recruitment of its judges and lawyers, and so it fell to each one of the 
national governments to choose the profile – politician, civil servant, magistrate or professor – the best 
placed to fulfill the international judicial office.In substance, this failure to build a common judicial 
standard meant that States mutually recognized each others’ ways of law and that there would be as 
many breeding grounds and profiles of judges as they were members at the Permanent court
73
. Absent 
a supranational profession with selection and regulatory powers, all national definitions would 
therefore be mutually accepted, and the international lawyer and judge could basically be ‘anyone’, 
whether professor-jurisconsult, magistrate, business lawyer, politician of the law or jurist-diplomat, 
who had been recognized and certified as such nationally. 
ii) Judges as Notables of International Affairs 
This lack of supranational professional standards would also be found in the imprecision that reigned 
on the rules of incompatibility that the new international judges would have to respect. All committee 
members pledged an equal commitment for securing judicial independence, particularly now that they 
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had drawn such a dividing line between (legal) adjudication and (political) arbitration
74
. Yet, when it 
came to define from which occupation would have to be declared incompatible with the judicial office, 
there is was little agreement. The special advisor of Elihu Root, James Brown Scott, recalls that, 
“while the goal (independence) was clear and within the view of every member; the means of attaining 
it disclosed much difference of opinion”75. Interestingly, the debate emerged incidentally in the middle 
of an apparently unproblematic discussion over the yearly calendar for the court's ordinary sessions. 
When the Rapporteur of the committee, Geouffre de Lapradelle, suggested that the Court would have 
to meet every year from the 15
th
 June to the 15
th
 October, he argued that: as « the national life of the 
various countries was less active » during this period, this calendar would not « deprive their 
respective countries entirely of their service »
76
. Implicitly, the French law professor was admitting 
that the international judicial office would be complemented by national positions. When Japanese 
member Adatci reacted saying that he « thought that the judges were to resign from their national 
occupations in order to internationalize themselves, to ‘deify’ themselves », the Italian member 
reacted with irony stating that « it would not be easy to find persons prepared to denationalize 
themselves or to ‘deify themselves’ »… Eventually, the opinion formulated by the British member, 
Lord Phillimore, that the judge’s « native country should not be entirely deprived of his services in so 
far as his international work allowed him leisure to be of service to his country » would be easily 
adopted as the commission’s view on the matter.  
This resulted in a very loose conception of judges’ incompatibilities with regard to their 
simultaneous commitment in adjacent fields of international affairs such as diplomacy, academia, 
national judiciary or even politics: M. de Lapradelle successfully defended the idea that “a great judge 
or a great professor (when international judge) must be allowed to continue in his present functions: no 
incompatibility exists in these cases. Similarly an eminent member of Parliament may retain his 
legislative function”. “Altogether unclear”77, the final article of the Statute which declared 
incompatible positions “which belong to the political direction, national or international, of states” 
would be actually be watered down by the Court itself when it would eventually start operating. In the 
first case of incomptability brought to its attention, that of Spanish senator and international judge 
Rafael Altamira
78
, the Court confirmed the very lenient approach, stating that « as long as the judge is 
independent from his government, there is no incompatibility » with political positions such as that of 
senator
79
. In other words, it was agreed that the best and the brightest that the World Court would need 
to attract in order for it to be an authoritative institution were precisely those who were engaged in 
their home countries in a variety of political and professional occupations related to the handling of 
international affairs (teaching, consulting, lawyering, advising, etc…). As a result, the specific model 
of professional excellency and legitimacy that emerged from the drafting of the Statute would ground 
legal worth and professional authority not so much on exteriority or independence from political 
affairs, as national judges would usually have it, but rather that of a notable of international affairs 
capable of intervening simultaneously in the many and different venues of international law, from 
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national to international settings, and from learned circles to political arenas or bureaucratic settings
80
. 
In sharp contrast with the national judge whose independence is secured by multiple rules of 
incompatibilities, the emerging figure of the ‘international judge’ would be first of all a hybrid figure: 
both a scientist of and an active participant to international politics; both a seasoned practitioner of 
international relations praised by his or her peers for his or her influence and wisdom and an expert 
listened to by the major players of international affairs for his or her expertise and scholarship. 
On the whole, the new international judiciary was recognized an autonomous province, but under 
the strict condition that the corresponding field of international law would remain under-regulated and 
deeply entangled with adjacent fields. Here is not the place to fully research and discuss how this 
social and professional pattern that emerged in 1921 has had channelling and delimiting effects and 
how this contingent historical arrangement became constitutive for the field of international law and 
for other transnational expert fields. Suffice it to say that the more recent ‘proliferation’ of 
international courts
81
 and the diversification of international law’s areas of intervention (trade, 
environment, human rights, etc...) did not alter the initial constellation. To be sure, the legal 
requirements for international judicial offices have progressively increased
82
 and one can observe a 
recent push for mainstreaming national practices of nomination by setting higher professional 
standards for judges (Burgh House principles, Venice Commission resolutions, etc…)83. However, the 
role of supranational bodies has stayed remarkably weak in comparison to the role of national 
government in choosing their own “judges” 84, thereby depriving international courts from a control 
over the field’s reproduction85. First indicators show that a similar weak structure can be identified for 
other transnational expert fields, starting with that of international economics where the domination of 
the mic-mac-metrics (micro-economics, macro-economics and econometrics)
86
 or that of central 
banking with the domination of a monetarist theory
87
 comes along with the perennial existence of a 
variety of breeding grounds, professional profiles, etc... 
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Conclusion. Transnational Expert Fields as Weak Fields 
Transnational expert fields do not hold by themselves through a sort of endogeneous and self-
referential logics. While they may seem similar to their national counterparts, a closer look to their 
genesis shows that they were born as embedded in deep-rooted national fields of power that have kept 
a strong hold on the socialization and the recruitment of international experts through primary 
socialization, educational breeding grounds, pathways to professional excellency, career paths to 
international positions, etc... As they keep an interstitial position in-between deep-seated national 
settings, transnational expert fields are particularly propitious arena for the building of common 
cognitive and normative frames of government. My general hypothesis is that such weakness is what 
renders transnational expert fields potentially salient when it comes to shaping international 
government’s cognitive and normative frames. First of all, these permeable boundaries with the many 
neighboring fields of politics, diplomacy, advocacy, etc. constitute a favorable context for multi-
positional entrepreneurs. In such settings where the border between science and practice are largely 
blurred, anyone can be at one and the same time a scholar forging new theories of international 
relations and a practitioner directly testing them in various policy domains. The most skilled 
participants can successively wear the mantle of scholarship, diplomacy, foreign affairs, advocacy and 
judicial practice. As they circulate across sectors and play on both parts of the academic and political 
fence, they are able to contribute to oft unnoticed forms of policy frames’ alignment and 
synchronization across otherwise segmented, if not antagonistic, fields. Second, such loosely 
structured fields imply that these expert sites (“expert committees”, “congresses”, “journals”, “learned 
societies”, etc…) are substantially different from what they refer to at the national level where expert 
fields are oft deep-seated and well established. By many standards, their international counterparts are 
more akin to the first Sociétés savantes of the late 19
th
 century, such as the American Social Science 
Association (1867) or the International Law Institute (1873), where ministers, statesmen, high civil 
servants, philanthropists, experts, academics would meet and mingle. As a result, they are at one and 
the same time an academic arena where renewed instruments of knowledge are built; a crossroads for 
exchanges and competitions among scholarly, advocacy, bureaucratic and political elites under the 
guise of discussing “current issues of international affairs”; and, last but not least, a mobilization 
device where a diverse set of law-endowed professionals gather to further the integrative capacity of 
the law in international affairs. Porous and overlapping with bureaucratic, economic, advocacy and 
political spaces, transnational expert fields eventually appear as essential sites of coordination and 
homogenization of commons frames of understanding the nature and future of international 
government. Just as in other complex and highly differentiated settings, such purported neutral fora 
located at the crossroads of otherwise distinct, if not antagonistic, sectors and groups are essential 
engines of the alignment of cognitive and normative frames of international government. Importantly 
however, this constitutive capacity of transnational expert fields is not unconditional: their in-between-
ness is not automatically conducive to such cumulative pooling of resources. In other words, the 
“weak field” approach does not imply any sort of ‘necessary’ social effect (“strong” or “weak”). Its 
main added value ultimately lies in its empirical potential the fact that it redirects the researcher’s gaze 
and empirical research towards the interstitial positioning of transnational expert fields and the 
specific type of “effet de champ” that their internal dynamics may actually stimulate. 
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